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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”) took ef-
fect on January 1, 1970.1 In its nearly fifty years of operation, NEPA
has become a fixed star of environmental law. NEPA requires the rel-
evant government agency—often with the assistance of an interested
private party—to perform an initial environmental assessment
(“EA”). Thereafter, if doubts remain about the environmental status
of the project, NEPA requires the agency to prepare a more compre-
hensive environmental impact statement (“EIS”) that may take mil-
lions of dollars and many years to perform. This issue has made its
way into political debate. In the spring of 2018, the Republican party
in the House of Representatives initiated an inquiry with the some-
what aggressive title “Weaponizing the National Environmental Policy
* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, the
Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution, and the James
Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Senior Lecturer, The Univer-
sity of Chicago. This paper is prepared for the conference on environmental law to be
held at Texas A&M Law School on March 9 and 10, 2018, under the joint sponsorship
of the Classical Liberal Institute. It was also presented at a faculty workshop at the
University of Iowa Law School on April 6, 2018. I thank Karen Bradshaw for her
comments on an earlier draft, and to Bijan Aboutorabi and Thomas Molloy, Univer-
sity of Chicago Class of 2018, Max Samels and Sarah Welch, University of Chicago
Class of 2019, and Matt Pociask, University of Chicago, Class of 2020, for their
prompt and excellent research assistance.
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Act.”2 I responded by offering the view that the success or failure of
NEPA depends not on how NEPA works in the uncontroversial cases
that present virtually no risk of environmental harms, but on how the
law treats the large projects that are subject to extensive review and
litigation, including the pipeline cases discussed in this Article. In light
of its past and current performance, NEPA does not deserve its near-
exalted status, neither as it was originally conceived nor as it is now
applied. This Article seeks to show how the NEPA program is fraught
with serious defects which lead, ironically, to an unintended situation
that combines higher risks of environmental harm with slower rates of
economic development.
This evaluation of NEPA does not ask whether it is appropriate to
provide comprehensive protection against various forms of environ-
mental depredation. Of course it is appropriate, and emphatically so.
Instead, the real questions here go to the choice of means, not the
admitted desirability of ends. In all too many ways, NEPA is highly
counterproductive in its mode of implementation. On many key
points, NEPA is consciously designed in opposition to the earlier ap-
proach to common law rules that integrate private remedies, via dam-
ages and injunction, with systems of public enforcement. Unlike these
schemes, NEPA allows for any project to be challenged by any person
on virtually any ground. Consequently, the strongest opponent exerts
the most powerful control over the process, for no longer is the
strongest opponent only one voice before the agency. Instead, that
opponent becomes the sole voice before that reviewing court.
In addition, NEPA makes a further serious structural error insofar
as it insists that in major cases all information be gathered and evalu-
ated by the relevant agency before it can take any action. The agency
could well deal with information by resisting the temptation to pack
everything into the initial analysis, for there is no need to rely on im-
perfect information to resolve the many remote and improbable con-
tingencies that are better fixed when they occur, if at all, down the
road. But, the “merely” procedural requirements under NEPA allow
courts to enjoin projects long before any sign of trouble arises, even
though most projects are likely to move smoothly to their conclusion.
These issues are, moreover, especially acute in dealing with the exten-
sive network of permits, both federal and state, required to complete
construction of an oil pipeline. Seriously misguided and overbroad
techniques of environmental protection are at stake here. These gar-
2. The Weaponization of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Implica-
tions of Environmental Lawfare: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Inves-
tigations of the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of James
Coleman, Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law, Horst G. Greczmiel, Former As-
sociate Dir., NEPA Oversight, Council on Envtl. Quality, Melissa Hamsher, Eclipse
Res. Corp., Vice President, Envtl. Health, Safety, & Regulatory, Dr. Laura Alice
Watt, Professor, Sonoma State Univ.).
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gantuan early efforts are counterproductive insofar as they ignore the
benefits of new projects that will eliminate the far greater environ-
mental risk associated with existing, often dilapidated or inferior, fa-
cilities. The lofty and proper ends of NEPA do not excuse its poor
mode of execution.
The plea most emphatically is not to end all regulation, but to ra-
tionalize its operation. Accordingly, the purpose of this Article is to
expose the weak technical underside of NEPA’s statutory scheme.
This inquiry does not start with NEPA itself, but, by way of compari-
son, with the earlier network of common law and equitable rules—
which for these purposes I shall treat as a single body of judge-made
common law—that made far wiser design choices in the structure of
the overall legal system. These rules, and their response to uncer-
tainty, are the subject of Section I of this Article. In Section II, this
Article evaluates the promise of NEPA as articulated in its original
preamble and in the early judicial decisions—most notably Calvert
Cliffs, Inc. v. United States3—that have aggressively interpreted its
reach. Section II also explores the determined insistence of the courts
to allow virtually all environmental mandates to be imposed without
compensating private property owners for their losses. Nonetheless,
these two large new sources of government power have done little to
advance the goals of NEPA. NEPA’s sweeping demands require pain-
ful ad hoc judicial adjustments in choosing remedies to curb the major
risk of environmental losses resulting from new project delays that are
more environmentally friendly than the grandfathered programs that
they are meant to displace. This is because the basic NEPA structure
makes it all too easy to ignore the gains from environmental innova-
tion by focusing exclusively on small, often irrelevant, losses from the
proposed new projects.
To illustrate this sad position, Part III of this Article recounts two
cases in which I prepared extensive commentary for Grow America’s
Infrastructure Now (“GAIN”)—a group that has supported creating
new pipelines and whose first success has been the clearance for oper-
ation of the Dakota Access Pipeline (“DAPL”), which has now been
uneventfully and successfully operating for the last eleven months.4
This Article also discusses the Bayou Bridge Pipeline (“BBP”), which
is now being completed after it was initially stopped in March 2018 in
a decision by Judge Shelly Dick, which was quickly overturned on an
interim appeal before the Fifth Circuit.5 Nonetheless, both cases have
3. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coord. Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
4. North Dakota’s Pipeline Payoff, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2017, 6:55 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/north-dakotas-pipeline-payoff-1514591716 [https://perma.cc/
TY5R-EEL7] (noting substantial increases in rail traffic, drilling, environmental
safety, tax revenues, and energy supplies).
5. See Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 894 F.3d 692 (5th
Cir. 2018).
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yet to receive their final clearance, even though it is highly unlikely
that either will be stopped. As it now stands, both cases face at least
one more round of judicial challenge.
II. COPING WITH REMEDIAL UNCERTAINTY:
THE COMMON LAW AND NEPA
Congress passed NEPA at the dawn of the environmental move-
ment as part of the vast public appeal of Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring6 and the extensive public outrage that stemmed from the pain-
ful inability of both private and government officials to stem the mas-
sive oil leaks into Santa Barbara waters in 1969.7 Ironically, these oil
leaks and Carson’s portrayal could not be more disparate.
With respect to Carson, the major consequence—I am reluctant to
call it an achievement—of Carson’s allegorical portrayal of the silent
spring where “no birds sing” was, as Ronald Bailey recounts, the
EPA’s ban of DDT in 1972.8 DDT is a chemical invented by the Swiss
scientist Robert Muller in the late 1930s, for which he won the Nobel
Prize in 1948, and it is credited with saving millions of lives from such
diseases as malaria and typhoid.9 The EPA made its decision to ban
DDT over the objection of its own administrative judge, who had rea-
soned that “DDT is not a carcinogenic hazard to man. . . . DDT is not
a mutagenic or teratogenic hazard to man. . . . The use of DDT under
the regulations involved here [does] not have a deleterious effect on
freshwater fish, estuarine organisms, wild birds or other wildlife.”10
Nonetheless, Carson insisted that DDT caused cancer, particularly in
small children. Her critics attack her process of statistical inference as
deeply flawed.11 No one denies that chemicals like DDT can have side
effects, but there is a vast difference between banning a chemical and
controlling the places where it is used, the amounts that are sprayed,
and the mode of its application. Using small quantities of DDT to
prevent malaria and other scourges is far wiser than other practices,
such as the ineffective use of netting, to achieve that same purpose.
The tragedy of the environmental movement in cases of this sort is its
6. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
7. See, e.g., Ari Philips, How A Massive Oil Spill In 1969 Changed Everything,
THINK PROGRESS (June 30, 2014, 1:45 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/how-a-massive-
oil-spill-in-1969-changed-everything-c4da7ecd5038/ [https://perma.cc/Z4VJ-FJT2].
8. Ronald Bailey, Silent Spring at 40: Rachel Carson’s Classic Is Not Aging Well,
REASON (June 12, 2002), http://reason.com/archives/2002/06/12/silent-spring-at-40
[https://perma.cc/4DD5-5X54] (criticizing her for the attack on DDT).
9. Id.
10. Edmund Sweeney, EPA Hearing Examiner’s Recommendations and Findings
Concerning DDT Hearings, 40 CFR § 164.32 (Apr. 25, 1972).
11. For a devastating analysis of all aspects of her science and work, see CATO
INST., SILENT SPRING AT 50: THE FALSE CRISES OF RACHEL CARSON (Roger Meiners
et al., eds., 2012). It is worth noting that of all the deadly diseases, progress against
malaria is still the slowest. For the table, see Steven Pinker, ENLIGHTENMENT NOW:
THE CASE FOR REASON, SCIENCE, HUMANISM, AND PROGRESS, 66 fig.6:1 (2018).
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utter lack of any sense of proportionality, which results when regula-
tors and advocates overstate risk, understate benefits, and reject re-
flexively all proposed accommodations. All the questions of proof
turn on inference rather than direct observation. I agree with those
who think that banning DDT was one of the great mistakes of the
age,12 but others, chiefly on the left, disagree.13
The evidentiary questions are quite different with the Santa Bar-
bara oil spill where direct visual evidence resolved all factual ques-
tions. Everyone could understand that spilling huge quantities of raw
oil into a picture-perfect environment counts as a classic nuisance of
epic proportions, actionable under any conceivable theory of tort law.
I know of no skeptic who thinks that pollution—set carbon dioxide
aside for the moment—is anything but a bad outcome that both gov-
ernment and private parties should take all efficient measures to pre-
vent.14 It is one thing, however, to be indignant about harm after the
fact, for which heavy fines are often the only workable remedy, and
another thing to design a system of anticipatory precautions that
achieves the right balance between economic activity and environ-
mental protection. The Santa Barbara oil spill represents a low
probability event that strikes with great devastation, if it strikes at all.
DDT, by contrast, is a substance capable of constant use that provides
a suite of long-term benefits and burdens that cry out for the regula-
tory controls that allows for its continued use given that its benefits in
preventing malaria far outweigh any negative effects. Using DDT
around sleeping quarters at night is one such accommodation. More
generally, patterns of usage and the distributions of benefits and
harms require very different approaches for pesticides and oil drilling,
but at a deeper level. However, they face the same basic challenge of
dealing with future uncertainties in the affairs of humankind: how to
deal with the pluses and minuses of activities that have both real up-
sides and dangerous downsides.
One of the great initial attractions of NEPA is that it purports to
build on the private and public law of nuisance with its long history in
dealing with this set of problems—even if the case law under NEPA
12. Rachel Carson’s Dangerous Legacy, SAFE CHEMICAL POL’Y (Mar. 1, 2007),
http://www.safechemicalpolicy.org/rachel-was-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/SJR3-CYPJ].
13. Rachel Carson’s Critics Keep on, but She Told Truth About DDT, YALE ENV’T
360 (Sept. 10, 2015), https://e360.yale.edu/features/rachel_carsons_critics_keep_on_
but_she_told_truth_about_ddt [https://perma.cc/XR4W-RND6]; John Bellamy Foster
& Brett Clark, Rachel Carson’s Ecological Critique, MONTHLY REV. (Feb. 1, 2008),
https://monthlyreview.org/2008/02/01/rachel-carsons-ecological-critique/ [https://per
ma.cc/AT96-DUGV].
14. For my systematic account of this topic, see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance
Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979).
The problem here is to explain why nuisances count as actionable externalities. For an
effort to show how this can be done rigorously by postulating a single owner with
control over all relevant inputs, see Richard A. Epstein, Positive and Negative Exter-
nalities in Real Estate Development, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1493 (2018).
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has moved, to its peril, far beyond its common law origins.15 As early
as 1536, the Anonymous case set out the correct relationship between
public and private nuisances.16 Private nuisances are, to use slightly
more modern terminology, “nontrespassory invasions,” such as filth,
noise, stench, and dangerous chemicals of all sorts, that emanated
from one party to another causing discomfort and annoyance to an
occupant.17 A public nuisance involves the same kind of conduct, only
now the damage is to public land and waters, where no single individ-
ual is in a position to bring suit to protect against the parallel harm to
all other individuals. The familiar collective action problem makes it
unlikely that any one individual will undertake action to protect all
others because he or she must bear the total cost of remedying the
situation but suffers only a fraction of the overall harm. The common
law response to this difficulty was to draw a distinction between spe-
cial and general damages. Anyone whose losses were of a magnitude
suffered by ordinary individuals in cases for property damage or per-
sonal injuries could maintain a private right of action. But for the rest
of the population, all private rights of action were put to one side,
given their high administrative costs relative to the size of their per-
sonal losses. In their place, the state imposed a fine against the wrong-
doer and took steps to remove the obstacle or, in the case of pollution
in public waters, clean up the overall mess. Full compensation for the
individual was sacrificed in order to advance global efficiency from
which all parties benefit.
These nuisance cases raise difficult issues in dealing with the timing
and integration of damages and injunctive relief. Nuisance law always
allows for actual damages after the fact, but it also allows for injunc-
tive relief to be imposed upon the initial occurrence or the imminent
risk of actionable harms.18 The law that governs these private nui-
sances is more complicated than the law applicable to most bodily in-
jury or property damage cases because it must deal with uncertainty,
which in all remedial contexts presents a choice between two kinds of
error: moving too quickly or moving too slowly. As both Silent Spring
and the Santa Barbara oil spill should remind us, the distinctive fea-
ture of this body of law is that it must mix and match remedies across
a wide number of circumstances. In general, the most sensible ap-
proach to this challenge is successive approximations. The initial move
is to allow injunctive relief ex ante that reduces the likelihood of viola-
15. For the initial and decisive departure, see Calvert Cliffs’ Coord. Comm., Inc. v.
U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (1971); infra Section II.A and note 24.
16. Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl.10 (1536). The approach is embod-
ied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 821B–821E (AM. L. INST. 1979).
17. See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E. 2d 682 (N.C. 1953).
18. See, e.g., Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 758 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2014)
(denying relief to tribal and public plaintiffs against a possible invasion of the Great
Lakes by the voracious Asian carp because the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a
current or imminent public nuisance).
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tion. If and when any oil leaks do occur, the initial use of an injunction
reduces the stress on calculating damages by first reducing the proper
level of damages. However, injunctive relief typically has diminishing
marginal returns until the next unit of legal protection from nuisances
causes massive dislocations to the parties whose activities are subject
to some aggressive form of injunctive relief. The response to this,
therefore, is to introduce two additional elements into the picture: (1)
allow for damages for measurable residual harms; and (2) allow low-
level reciprocal harms to be exempt from all liability under a rule of
live-and-let-live, whereby the gains to each person from the increased
liberty of action offset the losses from the small incursions on private
spaces.19 Beyond the public law protection, parties can stipulate for
additional benefits through the use of covenants, which, given their
high costs, are usually imposed as part of a common plan that binds
and benefits all persons equally regardless of the time at which the
persons acquire their interests.
The overall balance under the earlier common law system worked
well by ensuring that serious harms were curtailed in an expeditious
fashion without interfering prematurely and unduly by imposing oner-
ous ex ante restrictions that cause massive economic dislocation in ex-
change for little, if any, environmental relief. The key point in this
analysis is that the switch from private actions to public enforcement
is, or at least should be, driven in theory by one concern: to minimize
the transactions costs needed to enforce the substantive entitlements
articulated by the correct formulation of the private law.20 Impor-
tantly, the standards for measuring damages and issuing injunctions
largely carry over from the private law to the public law with only
modest changes to account for the added administrative capabilities of
public bodies in fine tuning remedies.21
This understanding can be usefully applied to the Santa Barbara oil
spill. There, the risk of a sudden rupture creates a factual pattern far
removed from the usual case of the slow leakage of pollutants into a
public waterway. Accordingly, the proper response in cases that could
involve catastrophic failure is to demand periodic inspections of facili-
ties already on-line to make sure that the facilities are properly main-
tained and operated. It is unclear whether these inspections should be
done by government, or the facility owner, or most likely both. Addi-
tionally, private insurers will routinely impose regular inspection
schedules on their insureds to reduce their exposure to liability. Thus,
one way for the government to reduce the need for its own indepen-
dent judgment is to require that certain types of dangerous facilities
19. See Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 25 [1860] (Bramwell, B.).
20. Richard A. Epstein, From Common Law to Environmental Protection: How
the Modern Environmental Movement Has Lost Its Way, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141,
167 (2015).
21. Id.
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purchase a high-limit insurance policy against the pollution risk. In
this way, an insurer’s private monitoring will supplement a firm’s re-
quired monitoring when its own assets must answer for any external
losses, which a sound insurance policy will insist upon, along with de-
ductibles, coinsurance provisions, and indemnity clauses. Even, there-
fore, in these cases, courts and agencies can deploy a larger arsenal of
administrative devices. These insurance requirements are routinely
imposed for the construction and operation of all pipelines.
Thus, in those cases where the single test of imminence does not
work, the appropriate response is to have continuous inspections of
ongoing work to detect, and correct, key risks. These periodic inspec-
tions and insurance risks are worlds apart from the current regime,
which requires that nothing be built until an exhaustive environmental
statement is prepared.22 This statement documents each and every
risk, however minute or improbable, and then recommends some in-
stitutional adjustments—often expensive—to deal with each and
every one of the identified risks.23 This heavy-handed approach makes
it impossible to adopt a sound policy—one that minimizes the impor-
tance of deciding when private litigation, like class actions, should
yield to public enforcement of the law. The line between public and
private nuisances is often challenged, such as when many businesses
are dislocated by street repairs, or even in cases where statutory ac-
tions caused the externalities.24 It would be intolerable if fine grada-
tions in legal understanding were to radically shift the terms of
potential liability, for then parties would have every incentive to arbi-
trage between systems. Environmental parties may prefer to move
into the public space to get more favorable forms of relief or to stay
out if the terms are not attractive. Thus, where tort relief is difficult to
obtain, environmental groups will challenge various projects under
NEPA. However, in the case of public nuisance claims for carbon di-
oxide, environmental groups, sensing political resistance from the
Trump administration, have made a beeline to private rights of action
under state law to obtain the most favorable path available.25 Unified
22. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C.S. § 4332
(2018).
23. Id.
24. Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) (finding special damages
for gaseous emissions suffered by a noncontiguous property owner injured by railway
operations).
25. For my critique of this position, see Richard A. Epstein, Is Global Warming a
Public Nuisance?, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/re-
search/global-warming-public-nuisance [https://perma.cc/RS8C-QL5C]. For a related
form of arbitrage, where some states claim that global warming will have disastrous
effects in their litigation but announce business as usual in dealing with the covenants
in their bond offers, see Richard A. Epstein, Global Warming and Bond Offerings,
FORBES (Jan. 22, 2018, 12:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2018/
01/22/global-warming-and-bond-offerings/#67d1b4e423c0 [https://perma.cc/X69V-
AH6F].
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substantive rules are needed to counteract this modern version of fo-
rum-shopping.
Indeed, if the common law rules are efficient—as I believe they
are—then any effort to ramp up the availability of injunctive relief
through the exercise of government permit power will necessarily cre-
ate many social losses. These losses do not stem solely from the addi-
tional cost and delay of implementing new projects. Instead, many of
these losses come from two other sources: (1) the implicit decision to
keep existing dangerous facilities in operation because of the inability
to obtain permits for newer ones; and (2) the interaction of multiple
permitting agencies operating in sequence—the federal government
and multiple state governments, for example—which means that the
denial of a single permit may stop the entire operation. In this regard,
compact sites face fewer obstacles than long, skinny sites such as wa-
terways, beachfront developments—or pipelines.
III. THE FALSE PROMISE OF NEPA
A. The Takings Dimension
The most notable feature of NEPA is how it shifts the emphasis
away from the perceived mundane task of preventing nuisances to the
far grander task of making, as is often said, man one with nature in
ways that eliminate damage to the environment. The act purports
“[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment.”26 More con-
cretely, it instructs the government “to use all practicable means and
measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner cal-
culated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and main-
tain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans”27—laudable objectives,
all. But this high-falutin’ prose glosses over what is always the key
question, namely the choice of means to achieve the stated ends. One
key dimension in that inquiry is the stark choice between regulation
(without compensation) and condemnation of property rights (with
compensation). This issue first gained prominence in dealing with the
remedial provisions of NEPA. At its passage, it was generally assumed
that all enforcement work would be done by informal deliberation
within the agency, where, as noted above, no one voice would be
heard more than any other.28 But without any textual authorization, in
Calvert Cliff, Judge Skelly Wright held, without much argument, that
26. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 2, 42 U.S.C.S. § 4321 (2018).
27. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C.S. § 4331 (2018).
28. For discussion, see Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in
the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J.
1507, 1513–14 (2012).
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NEPA created a private right of action by declaring, “These cases are
only the beginning of what promises to become a flood of new litiga-
tion—litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting our natural
environment.”29 NEPA does not itself set out any substantive stan-
dards, which are the province of the various substantive statutes. In-
stead, the remedies under NEPA add the teeth of an injunction, by
imposing an ever-higher standard of review to examine the determina-
tions of government officials in applying various substantive statutes,
such as the Clean Water Act or the Rivers and Harbor Act.30
Another topic that NEPA does not address is the choice between
having the government buy a critical habitat and other resources from
a private owner, or letting the government designate that habitat as
protected without compensation. However, twenty-five years after its
passage, the misguided decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter fi-
nally settled the matter by upending the key architecture of takings
law by holding, under the Endangered Species Act, that the govern-
ment gets a free option to choose between regulation and condemna-
tion to control any activity that it regards as harmful.31 NEPA offers
no guidance on how any government official should make that choice,
but leaves the entire matter up to Congress or, in the event of their
silence, to the agencies.
It is always a mistake to give that level of administrative latitude to
any public official, for save in rare circumstances they will always pre-
fer to take without payment. That option gives them far greater power
than private parties ever obtain over the activities of their neighbors.
Private landowners may restrain traditional nuisances as of right but
must purchase covenants to restrict other forms of land use. If com-
pensation must come from the state, then government regulators will
account for those dislocations and consider whether the benefits of
those restrictions outweigh the costs. By treating the two courses of
action—designation without compensation and condemnation with
compensation—as legal equivalents, Justice Stevens in Sweet Home
created perverse incentives on both sides.32 Now, government can des-
ignate habitat without consequence to its own budgets and, thus, will
often overclaim habitat with only scant regard to the losses suffered
by their owners. Similarly, private owners subject to habitat preserva-
tion ordinances could well decide to destroy endangered species by
following a policy of “shoot, shovel, and shut up” to avoid costly regu-
29. Calvert Cliffs’ Coord. Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1111 (1971).
30. For a discussion of the evolution, see Lazarus, supra note 28, at 1514–18.
31. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. 68 (1995). For my extended views,
Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon: The Law and Eco-
nomics of Habitat Preservation, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1996).
32. Id.
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lations.33 The wildlife, originally thought to be a social benefit, now
becomes a private liability. If the government were restricted to the
condemnation option instead, the private owner would be now cor-
rectly incentivized to treat the habitat as an asset worth preserving in
order to get maximum value from the state by condemnation or by
private sale to conservation groups. Yet, no single word in NEPA or
Sweet Home addresses these key incentive issues.
B. Moving Too Fast or Too Slow—the Perils of Searching
for Complete Information
The situation gets no better in designing remedial measures to deal
with the prospective forms of pollution actionable at common law.
NEPA’s bold declarations all concentrate only on one form of error—
letting dangerous materials from new projects into the environment.
This one-sided approach is captured in a bold declaration by Richard
Lazarus: “NEPA’s simple admonishment that government planners
should in effect ‘look before they leap’ has prompted the preparation
of approximately 34,000 draft and final EISs and successfully pre-
vented at least hundreds, and likely thousands, of actions from causing
unnecessary damage to the nation’s environment.”34 Unfortunately,
the other type of error—the risk of moving too slow—is simply
ignored.
Thus, NEPA regards injunctions and permits solely as means to
preventing new harms from occurring. The problem of allowing new
advances to remove or reduce older harms is not mentioned. Instead,
there is a very powerful set of judicial sentiments, which were summa-
rized accurately by Judge Boasberg in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
(“SRST” or the “Tribe”) litigation:
The National Environmental Policy Act, the statute under which the
majority of the Tribes’ claims are brought, has two aims: it places
upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of
the environmental impact of a proposed action, and it ensures that
the agency will inform the public that it has indeed considered envi-
ronmental concerns in its decisionmaking process. NEPA’s require-
ments are “procedural,” requiring agencies to imbue their
decisionmaking, through the use of certain procedures, with our
country’s commitment to environmental salubrity. Importantly,
NEPA does not mandate particular consequences, and courts are
discouraged from substituting their own policy judgments for that of
the agency. NEPA merely prohibits uninformed — rather than un-
wise — agency action. Agency actions with adverse environmental
effects can thus be NEPA compliant where “the agency has consid-
33. Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the
Endangered Species Act. 46 J.L. & ECON. 27, 29–30 (2003); Ralph R. Reiland, Shoot,
Shovel & Shut Up, AM. SPECTATOR (Apr. 7, 2004, 4:06 AM), https://spectator.org/
50307_shoot-shovel-shut/ [https://perma.cc/KWK9-YGHA].
34. Lazarus, supra note 28 at 1510.
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ered those effects and determined that competing policy values out-
weigh those costs.35
It is absolutely critical to understand the profound errors in this ca-
nonical approach. In the conventional view, the EPA “merely” uses its
procedure devices to make sure that the decisions about any project
subject to agency review, whether private or public, is made on an
“informed basis.” But it is a huge non-sequitur to hold that an in-
formed judgment depends on obtaining full information about a given
problem before taking any steps. People must make complex deci-
sions in their private lives, and in doing so they respect the marginalist
principle that each additional unit of information should provide
greater benefits than the costs of its acquisition. It follows that most
people seek—and usually find—an intermediate level of investigation
that works best in their particular context.
There are three basic options. One option involves an effort to de-
velop a formal and complete model incorporating every relevant vari-
able that could, in principle, impact a decision. But, the cost in time
and energy makes this approach impracticable for any ordinary busi-
ness or personal decision. At the other end of the intellectual lies a
reliance on hunch and intuition not backed by any theoretical insight
or experiential data, which could resemble a random guess. Between
those two extremes lies what has come to be called “fast and frugal”
techniques, in which a few key variables drive the decision to the ex-
clusion of all other relevant factors.36 Roughly speaking, this approach
asks the decisionmaker to line up, on the right-hand side of the regres-
sion, all the relevant terms in order by the size of their expected coef-
ficients. This approach then concentrates exclusively on the first two
or three of these independent variables and ignores the rest to reach a
usable decision in any particular case.37 Logically, the weaker terms
will tend to cancel each other out, so that using only the major terms
gives more reliable information at lower cost than an exhaustive ex-
amination of all purportedly relevant features.
This method will occasionally fail, for the same reason that long-
shots sometimes win horseraces. But, ex ante, it is always critical to
play the odds. Finding what the relevant parameters are is often a
difficult challenge, which is why agencies must complete many trial
runs to empirically validate any short-term protocol they use to de-
cide, for example, whether to admit people into the hospital after they
present with chest pains at the emergency room.38 The need for speed
35. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101,
112–13 (D.D.C. 2017).
36. Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way:
Models of Bounded Rationality, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 650, 669 (1996).
37. Id.
38. See Richard A. Epstein, Intuition, Custom, and Protocol: How to Make Sound
Decisions With Limited Knowledge, 2 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2006), https://chicago
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is greater in the emergency room than in most environmental settings.
But, it hardly follows that a leisurely journey through endless stacks of
information comes without cost, given that existing facilities may de-
preciate rapidly in value. Indeed, the best protocols, when both forms
of error are high, usually ask three or four key questions and then
produce, for example, a decision to admit a patient—which could
needlessly tie up costly equipment—or send him home—which could
lead to death. Nonetheless, the standard protocol developed painfully
at the Cook County Hospital had fewer errors in both directions than
the judgment of experienced medical practitioners—saving both cost
and time.39
There is often, then, a negative correlation between making an ex-
haustive inquiry and achieving sound results. This danger is com-
pounded when the words “merely” and “procedural” are given their
full weight. Once the EIS is filed in approved form, the agency can
decide to approve a project even though there are doubts as to its
wisdom. That has to be the case, for otherwise nothing could get done;
every complex project necessarily involves some kind of trade-off be-
tween expected advantages and detriments. But, never overlook the
key issue of timing. Given NEPA, nothing can be done until all the
endless layers of review are satisfactorily completed. In effect, the in-
ability to clear the EIS hurdle operates as a de facto form of injunctive
relief against the completion of a project, even if the fast and frugal
case in favor of going forward turns out to be overwhelming. The test
of imminent danger is flipped over allowing massive premature inter-
vention based on speculation about low probability events. The sys-
tem of periodic inspections is nowhere to be found under the NEPA
protocols. This creates powerfully destructive incentives. All that an
opponent of a project needs to do to initiate the process of derailing
the project is to seek judicial review. Then, as there are multiple
points of attack for any given project, it could take only one or a very
small number of objections to sink a project that passes any sensible
cost-benefit case.
C. Remedial Obstacles and Escape Valves
Exhibit one of this folly is a nearly-forgotten 1960s case that antici-
pated, and perhaps shaped, the form of judicial intervention under
NEPA. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission, the Second Circuit held that the various townships that
composed the Preservation Council counted as an “aggrieved party”
entitled to challenge a Federal Power Commission decision to author-
ize the construction of the huge Storm King electrification project, lo-
unbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2220&context=journal_articles
[https://perma.cc/S8RC-YXXD].
39. Id. at 20–21. The use of protocols does not depend on intuition but on the
exhaustive study of voluminous data.
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cated on the west bank of the Hudson River, to supply power to New
York City.40 The transformative upshot of that decision was that par-
ties who did not like the decision of an administrative agency could
now challenge it in court. Once that challenge is raised, the decision
erroneously took the view that the Commission could only discharge
its function if “the record on which it bases its determination is
complete.”41
The result in Scenic Hudson I was predictable, even inevitable: the
court set aside the initial order, with a demand for further proceed-
ings.42 At this point, the situation was fraught with peril because the
new hearing would face a double challenge. First, the lower court
would have to consider all of the factual and legal issues addressed in
the original hearing, with the added burden of updating the analysis to
incorporate relevant changes in the record, the science, and the law,
since that initial application had been filed. In addition, Judge Hays’s
original opinion expanded the set of relevant factors by reading “rec-
reational” broadly so that it “encompasses the conservation of natural
resources, the maintenance of natural beauty, and the preservation of
historic sites,” each of which had to be “properly weighed.”43 Not sur-
prisingly, the rehearing procedure took six years to complete before,
in another thorough opinion, the same court concluded that the new
studies by the FPC had indeed covered omitted issues including plant
siting, transmission lines, effects on fish, choice of alternative sites,
and other subordinate matters.44
It was yet another case of too little, too late. The costs of delay
turned out to be decisive, especially since Commonwealth Edison had
no guarantee that the divided vote in Scenic Hudson II was the last
word on the matter. Indeed, the case reached its final resting point in
1980, fifteen years after the first decision. Consolidated Edison settled
the case with Scenic Hudson. Under the deal, Consolidated Edison
abandoned its construction plans and made further payments to the
groups that began the protest. As to the ultimate merits of the initial
siting decision or the collapse of the project, it is hard to judge from a
distance. The entire sequence of events counts as a classic example of
justice delayed equaling justice denied. The “mere” procedural barri-
ers made it impossible to follow the sensible approach: to allow the
construction to start after an initial hearing, subject to oversight and
inspection, knowing that further upgrades could both be required and
made in the ordinary course of business. These upgrades are routinely
done on existing facilities, so there is no institutional imperative to
40. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
41. Id. at 612.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 614.
44. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
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make that all-or-nothing judgment before any construction work is
undertaken at all.
Clearly, there is too much imbalance in any system that makes these
epic all-or-nothing decisions on what is always incomplete informa-
tion. Any system that has this absolutist quality requires some modifi-
cation to let off steam lest the pressure cooker explode. Often times
when the initial set of rules imposes unrealistic expectations on the
regulated parties, the regulatory response is often to develop a sec-
ond-tier system of waiver in order to introduce a more reasonable
standard.45 There are unavoidable difficulties with these processes
that infect all such decisions because it is difficult to determine which
parties are entitled to receive these waivers, how long they last, what
conditions are attached to them, and how any renewal process is to be
evaluated. The waivers may also open the possibility of favoritism
whereby the political friends of the government administration get
better treatment than their rivals.
Just this dilemma arises under the EPA, where the standard rule
requires a court to vacate the decision of an administrative body when
there is any error involved. Thus, for example, the standard rule is, as
Judge Boasberg writes in Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, that the review-
ing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”46
In the D.C. Circuit, vacatur is the “standard remedy” for a NEPA
violation.47 But, true to form, it is only a “presumption” that vacatur is
required until the applicable agency brings itself into compliance.48 At
this point, the key question is what test governs the exceptions that
should be created to the rule. In the D.C. Circuit, the answer is encap-
sulated in Allied-Signal v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which
articulates this test: “The decision whether to vacate depends on ‘the
seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt
whether the agency chose correctly) and the disruptive consequences
of an interim change that may itself be changed.’”49 The statutory
gloss in many cases consumes the basic vacatur rule by making the
relevant test look as though it requires a balance of equities in the
case.
45. See Richard A. Epstein, Government by Waiver, 7 NAT’L AFF. 39 (2011), http:/
/www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/government-by-waiver [https://perma.cc/
EX2Z-B9UZ].
46. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 301 F. Supp. 3d 50,
58 (D.D.C. 2018).
47. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 282 F. Supp. 3d 91,
96 (D.D.C. 2017).
48. Id.
49. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 988 F.2d. 146, 150–51 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
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At this point, it is useful to review some of the decisions taken
under the Allied-Signal approach because they afford a useful contrast
to the very different state of affairs that arise in Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe.50 The change in geometric shapes powerfully affects every as-
pect of the case. Pipelines—like waterways—are long and thin, and
are subject to physical and legal vulnerabilities because of that elon-
gated structure. Cut the pipeline in any place, and the oil cannot go
from end to end, so supplies stack up at one end with shortages at the
other. The legal consequences are the same: if different segments of
the pipeline are subject to controls by different jurisdictions, an ad-
verse decision in any single jurisdiction will necessarily block the use
of all other segments of the pipeline. Put otherwise, pipelines are sub-
ject to multiple vetoes, and thus are only as strong as their weakest
link. None of these points are lost on either the pipeline owners, their
many federal and state oversight boards and regulators, or of course
the many objectors to their construction. In these circumstances, the
vacatur remedy could be disastrous because one no-vote could negate
the effect of a dozen other approvals. It is key, therefore, to examine
the precedents in order to determine whether they offer apt analogies
to the case at hand.
Turning first to Allied-Signal, its sole question was whether certain
costs for “regulatory services” in overseeing nuclear facilities were
correctly allocated among the various recipients.51 The plaintiff’s only
requested relief was a recalculation of various monetary shares that
would allow some parties to recover a refund, while others would in-
cur additional costs.52 There were no operational issues, and no third-
party effects from these decisions. Yet, the D.C. Circuit still refused to
issue a cessation order under the test set out above.53 The contrast
between those modest financial recalculations—which take a few
hours of computer time—and the national restructuring of rail, truck,
and pipeline operations—which can take months or years—should be
apparent. If the injunctive relief was denied in that case, the pipeline
case should a fortiori receive the same treatment.
Other cases also show a sensible selection of applicable remedies. In
National Parks & Conservation Association v. Babbitt, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held an injunction to be appropriate when the Park Service pro-
posed a substantial increase in the number of large boats taking
tourists to Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve.54 The harms in
that case were not remote or speculative. Indeed, the harms were
50. For the last of these decisions, see Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2017); Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs. 205 F. Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016).
51. Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d. at 150–51.
52. Id. at 151.
53. Id.
54. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 725–26 (9th Cir.
2001).
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likely to occur immediately and continuously, for as the government
acknowledged, the new plan “would expose the park’s wildlife to in-
creased multiple vessel encounters, noise pollution, air pollution, and
an increased risk of vessel collisions and oil spills.”55 There was no
clear evidence as to how much additional pollution was likely to oc-
cur, so the Ninth Circuit concluded simply, and correctly, that “[t]he
data were insufficient.”56 No sunk costs complicated the judgment, so
vacatur was eminently defensible under the circumstances.
Similarly, in Fund for Animals v. Norton, the government program
called for the immediate killing of some 525 mute swans pursuant to a
depredation permit.57 The Court rightly ordered a suspension of the
program, which had not yet begun, because no one had completed the
preliminary study to determine whether killing the swans would have
the desired operational effect.58 Once again, the harm was perfectly
certain, so that a fuller hearing on the justifications for such an irre-
versible step can be sensibly required. Additionally, there was an ob-
vious urgency in the case, given that these swans had been around for
some time. Accordingly, the case is easily distinguishable from any
pipeline dispute, where the potential danger lies only in the occur-
rence of low probability events for which it is possible to take correc-
tive steps even after pipeline construction is completed.
Finally, in Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, the parties disputed the ex-
tent of an admitted discharge into a wetland from an extensive new
development project.59 In the case, it was uncertain whether the leak
was attributable to some isolated human error or to some structural
defect.60 The court stressed that the declarations by many experts that
the development would have a significant adverse impact “alone fail
to rise to the level of controversy under the EPA” needed to trigger a
vacatur.61 These cases, and others like them, do not suggest that it is
only in exceptional cases that the vacatur is ordered. The balance of
equities moves in the opposite direction. The question now arises how
these various tests should apply to the ongoing Dakota Access Pipe-
line case.
In dealing with pipelines, context matters. At the outset, it should
be apparent that pipeline cases present special challenges to any per-
mitting system. Their long and skinny nature means that multiple
agencies must give their approvals for the entire project to take place.
These two cases indicate just how arduous the process can become.
55. Id. at 725.
56. Id. at 737.
57. Fund for Animals v. Norton, 281 F. Supp. 2d 209, 213 (D.D.C. 2003).
58. Id.
59. Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 719 F. Supp. 2d 58, 60 (D.D.C. 2010).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 67–68.
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DAPL extends for nearly 1,172 miles and runs through five differ-
ent states: North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Illi-
nois—and each of these states has its own elaborate review before
their respective state public utility commission to examine both issues
of location and leakage.62 Indeed, NEPA contains no provisions that
address this complex set of interactions is something NEPA did not
foresee. Well-advised objectors are thus able to play one set of regula-
tors against the other, by insisting that anyone who undertakes one
part of the project necessarily assumes the risk of all delays should the
project be blocked elsewhere for any reason. But if that were re-
quired, then no project could ever get off the ground in light of the
huge losses that follow should one permit be denied. The alternative
approach is to reduce systematic uncertainty by cutting back on the
rigid standards of the modern EIS to allow projects to begin in a
timely fashion, where all regulators are duty-bound to issue their deci-
sions in a reasonable time under clear rules. This coordination was in
fact achieved by all the state public utility commissions.63 The federal
government however, remained the outlier, mainly because of the
hardline positions that it took on both the siting and construction of
DAPL on federal land.
On the former issue, it is quite clear that no route will be able to
avoid all criticism. The physical constraints are such that once the ba-
sic route is determined, there are only limited degrees of freedom to
alter its direction. Here, the route chosen by DAPL, and approved by
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps” or the “Corps”)
was intended to achieve several goals, none of which were disputed in
the case. The first goal included picking the shortest route, which
reduces the total disruption of terrain, the chance of leakage, and the
cost of completion.64 With DAPL, the alternative longer route went
through Bismarck, and Judge Boasberg already concluded that this
route was inferior on all relevant grounds.65 Second, the route in ques-
62. Route, Dakota Access Pipeline Facts, https://daplpipelinefacts.com/route/
[https://perma.cc/MN94-VSLT].
63. What Approvals Were Needed of the Route for the Dakota Access Pipeline?,
DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE FACTS, https://daplpipelinefacts.com/dt_articles/what-ap
provals-were-needed-of-the-route-for-the-dakota-access-pipeline/ [https://perma.cc/C
64S-AMAZ].
64. Amy Dalrymple, Pipeline Route Plan First Called for Crossing North of Bis-
marck, BISMARCK TRIB. (Aug. 18, 2016), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-
regional/pipeline-route-plan-first-called-for-crossing-north-of-bismarck/article_64d0
53e4-8a1a-5198-a1dd-498d386c933c.html [https://perma.cc/2JQ3-PLZT].
65. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d
101, 135 (D.D.C. 2017):
That data reveals that the Bismarck alternative would have required an addi-
tional 11 miles of pipeline, “consisting of roughly 165 additional acres of
impact,” 11 more floodplain crossings, 1 more powerline crossing, and 27
more transportation crossings. In addition, it would have “crossed through
or in close proximity to several wellhead source water protection areas” and
“crossed other populated PHMSA high consequence areas”—i.e., “locales
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tion was picked to track existing facilities to further reduce any dislo-
cations to still virgin terrain.66 In this instance, the plan in question
sent the pipeline through government lands at a location about one-
half mile away from the SRST tribal lands, through which multiple
earlier pipelines had run.67 In addition, the DAPL pipeline was of
more modern design and was located between 95–115 feet below
grade—far deeper than the earlier pipelines.68 At that distance, it was
close to 100 feet below Lake Oahe—a shallow man-made lake that
had been created by the Army Corps in 1958 to which the SRST now
attaches deep religious significance.69 But, it would take a spill of gen-
uinely catastrophic proportions to cause any damage anywhere in the
system. This topic was addressed in the documents that DAPL
presented for the Environmental Assessment.70 This diagram shows
the differences:71
The story is the same on the construction side. Pipeline safety, both
in construction and in operation, has improved greatly in the past gen-
eration, so the new pipeline is safer than the older pipeline that is
where a release from a pipeline could have the most significant adverse con-
sequences”—“not present on the [selected] route.” The North Dakota Pub-
lic Service Commission, moreover, requires a 500-foot residential buffer,
which would have “severely constrained” the Bismarck route. (Internal cita-
tions omitted.)
66. Catherine Thorbecke, Why a Previously Proposed Route for the Dakota Access
Pipeline Was Rejected, ABC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016, 4:19 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/
US/previously-proposed-route-dakota-access-pipeline-rejected/story?id=432744356
[https://perma.cc/L8MG-3MD2].
67. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 114.
68. Are There Any Other Pipelines Under Lake Oahe?, DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE
FACTS, https://dap1pipelinefacts.com/dt_articles/pipelines-lake-oahe/ [https://perma
.cc/N4K3-3P36].
69. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 114.
70. Environmental Assessment: Dakota Access Pipeline Project, U.S. ARMY CORPS
OF ENG’RS, https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16021coll7/id/2427/
[https://perma.cc/T44A-W5EZ] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
71. The Dakota Access Pipeline Is the Best Way to Move Bakken Crude Oil to
Market, DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE FACTS, https://daplpipelinefacts.com/ [https://per
ma.cc/4WT8-ZTW3] (last visited Aug. 13, 2018).
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already in location. The American Petroleum Institute summarized its
position as follows: “A comparison of three-year spill averages for the
periods 1999–2001 and 2009–2011 shows a 60% decrease in the num-
ber of spills per 1,000 miles of pipeline and a 43% decrease in the
volume spilled per 1,000 miles of pipeline.”72 The newer pipelines
should show lower levels of risk than pipelines completed at least
seven years before. In this case, moreover, the construction of a pipe-
line presents far greater risk than its operation because it involves ex-
posed materials and heavy equipment. Once the pipeline is
constructed, the safest course is to put it into ordinary operation. In-
deed, letting any facility sit unused is itself the source of additional
risk, for pipelines can deteriorate in much the same fashion as unoccu-
pied homes. Newer pipelines have far superior multiple monitoring
and safety checks than earlier ones, which reduces the need to use
trains and trucks in shipping crude oil. DAPL thus allows greater
quantities of crude oil to be shipped in greater safety.73
However, the situation is quite different under NEPA, which layers
on additional requirements that work at cross purposes with any sensi-
ble form of risk assessment. Thus, in his last decision on the issue to
date, Judge Boasberg took the position that it was a close call on
whether he should grant the SRST their requested order to stop oper-
ation of the pipeline, which had been completed before his decision of
June 14, 2017. He stated his concerns as follows:
[T]he Corps’ decision on July 25, 2016, and February 3, 2017, not to
issue an EIS largely complied with NEPA. Yet there are substantial
exceptions: the agency failed to adequately consider the impacts of
an oil spill on Standing Rock’s fishing and hunting rights and on
environmental justice, and in February 2017, it did not sufficiently
weigh the degree to which the project’s effects are likely to be
highly controversial in light of critiques of its scientific methods and
data.74
He then conducted a remedial valuation and concluded by letting
the pipeline continue in operation until further studies could be com-
pleted by the Army Corps. It is useful to look at each of these sup-
posed sticking points.
1. Fishing and Hunting Rights
On the question of fishing and hunting rights, Judge Boasberg in-
vokes the trope of complete disclosure to insist that the Corps must
“disclose and assess the suite of risks from the Lake Oahe crossing
72. Improving Pipeline Safety, ENERGY API, http://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-
gas/wells-to-consumer/transporting-oil-natural-gas/pipeline/improving-liquid-pipe-
line-safety [https://perma.cc/Z8HC-K9YQ] (last visited Aug. 13, 2018).
73. Safety, DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE FACTS, https://daplpipelinefacts.com/safety/
[https://perma.cc/TF9B-7YZD].
74. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 147.
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and the effect on the full range of the Tribe’s Treaty rights, in the
context of the Corps’ heightened trust responsibilities.”75 However,
this comes with the caveat that the Tribe cannot veto this pipeline on
the grounds that its mere existence “could affect its members in the
broad and existential ways it details.”76 The first question is why this
issue has any salience whatsoever. The eight existing pipelines in the
region pose greater threats to the fishing and hunting rights. But,
“greater” in this instance means virtually no dangers at all; a result
that is confirmed by the simple observation that the operation of these
existing pipelines over many years has not yet resulted in any such
harm. It should follow that any safer pipeline, located deeper under-
ground, should have the same result. It is therefore a complete mys-
tery as to why an independent evaluation of this matter is required:
the finding of general overall safety necessarily includes safety on this
matter.
This is yet another instance where the failure to put new facilities
into context skews the required cost-benefit analysis under NEPA.
Nonetheless, Judge Boasberg missed that obvious inference when he
wrote that the Corps had “adequately discussed the impacts of such a
low risk/high consequence event on water—but not on hunting or
aquatic—resources.”77 However, that statement ignores the high cor-
relation between the two, for it is not easy to imagine any scenario
that could hurt animals and fish without polluting the water on which
their lives depend. It is not credible to assume, as SRST postulates,
that a slow leak from that pipeline would go unnoticed until massive
amounts of crude oil bubbled to the surface of the water some ninety
or more feet above the pipeline. The SRST did not point to a single
instance of a leak or spill from preexisting pipelines, all of which are
less well-constructed and less well-situated than DAPL. A cost-benefit
analysis should be able to draw inferences from undisputed data based
on years of accumulated practice. The application process should not
have to start afresh each and every time some new project is contem-
plated. Both the probability and severity of any environmental harm
are so well established that it is pointless to demand a separate exer-
cise for the subset of fishing and hunting rights.
2. Environmental Justice
The next concern involved the principles of environmental justice
that Executive Order 12898, signed by then-President Bill Clinton in
February 1994, brought into the approval process.78 The gist of that
order was to ensure that the EPA was committed to “mak[ing] achiev-
ing environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and ad-
75. Id. at 130.
76. Id. at 131.
77. Id. at 133.
78. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 32 (Feb. 11, 1994).
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dressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities
on minority populations and low-income populations in the United
States.”79 That order applies with full force to all indigenous people,
including SRST. Under the order, “[t]he EPA defines ‘environmental
justice,’ as the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all peo-
ple regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to
the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental
laws, regulations, and policies.”80
This provision ensures that dangerous facilities such as garbage
dumps and waste disposal sites are not located near minority or poor
communities, who are no less entitled than others to protection
against offensive pollution from landfills, industrial plants, or truck
depots. But, the basic structure of DAPL obviates the concern. All
affected groups are protected by the engineering imperatives for
sound pipeline design. The pipeline must be of uniform quality for its
entire 1,172 mile length so that the precautions taken for its design
and construction near minority of religious communities are the same
as those everywhere else along its entire length. Indeed, the construc-
tion challenges in this instance were far greater under the Missouri
River than under Lake Oahe. Pipelines wind their way through many
different terrains, and pipeline operators suffer huge losses no matter
where a leak or spill takes place. The uniform safety and soundness
standards at all locations give poor and minority neighbors the same
protection as private property owned by rich or white persons. Ac-
cordingly, there is no need for any special study on these environmen-
tal studies here.
In this context, any protests on grounds of environmental justice
should be a nonstarter. Nonetheless, Judge Boasberg took the argu-
ment in a wholly indefensible direction when he criticized the Corps
for using the wrong reference base by underestimating the percentage
of poor people and minorities in the region around Lake Oahe.81 He
quarreled with the Army Corps’ decision to use its standard area mea-
sure of 0.5 miles, when the boundary of the reservation is only eighty
yards further away.82 But, his approach wholly ignores the correct
form of marginal analysis. If we know that the probability of any pol-
lution reaching the 0.5-mile limit is miniscule, the probability is neces-
sarily smaller of the pollution reaching further. In essence, his call for
79. 59 Fed. Reg. 32.
80. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, POLICY ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOR WORKING
WITH FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED TRIBES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 1–2 (2014), https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/ej-indigenous-policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YG33-T2L6].
81. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 138.
82. Id. at 137.
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a further examination is an exercise in misplaced caution—there is no
need to consider an infinitesimal risk of an infinitesimal loss.
Indeed, the situation is worse because of what was omitted from this
NEPA analysis. The analysis does not contain a single word that
speaks to the serious risks of damage from wayward trucks and de-
railed trains, which dwarf the picayune issues that attracted Judge
Boasberg’s scrutiny. Thus, environmental groups have been rightly in-
sistent that there are strong reasons to ban oil trains immediately—in
light of such catastrophes as the Megantic oil wreck of July 6, 2013,
which released tens of thousands of gallons of Bakken crude oil close
to a school and city center.83 Consequently, this tragedy should en-
courage new pipeline construction that would allow the other modes
of surface transportation to be put out of business.
3. Controversial Findings
Judge Boasberg’s last query asked whether the project was likely
“to be highly controversial in light of critiques of its scientific methods
and data.”84 He made this announcement in February 2017, after the
occurrence of two highly dubious actions of the Obama administra-
tion. The first was the joint decision of the Departments of Justice, the
Army, and the Interior not to enforce the victory obtained under
Judge Boasberg’s September 9, 2016 decision. The decision rejected
multiple challenges that the SRST had raised against the application,
most notably under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,
which set out an elaborative consultative process that federal officials
had to comply with before issuing a permit.85 As Judge Boasberg de-
tailed in his opinion, the SRST was wholly uncooperative in that pro-
cess and rebuffed repeated efforts by the Corp and DAPL
representatives to discuss those issues. In light of Judge Boasberg’s
exhaustive findings, the actions of the Obama administration were in-
explicable. Yet, the swift nature of the response—about an hour after
the decision came down—makes it clear that the three branches of
Obama administration—Department of Justice, The Department of
the Interior, and the Army Corps of Engineers—made their collective
decision to ask for a “voluntary” cessation of construction activities in
anticipation that Judge Boasberg would rule in favor of the
government.
The second notable action was the decision of the Department of
the Army to override the recommendation of the Army Corps, by or-
83. Todd Paglia, Top Five Reasons to Ban Oil Trains Immediately, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 30, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/todd-paglia/top-5-reasons-to-
ban-oil_b_10738926.html [https://perma.cc/C6KR-VW2Y].
84. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 147.
85. National Historic Preservation Act, 80 Stat. 915, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq. (re-
pealed 2014).
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dering a full EIS on December 4, 2016.86 That decision was a con-
scious repudiation of the work of the Army Corps, which had
prepared papers recommending to Congress—whose final approval
was needed—that the last segment of the pipeline should be built over
public lands and that the pipeline be allowed to build its last segment
over public lands. The Army Corps’ short memorandum only
rehashed early objections to the pipeline by dealing with such matters
as an alternative route, which had already been thoroughly vetted. It
defies common sense that these documents, coupled with the expert
testimony submitted on the part of the SRST, could force a full EIS at
that late date by allowing the intense objection of government officials
and private parties to count as an independent reason to block a pro-
ject, wholly apart from articulation of sufficient reasons to override all
earlier decisions.
Moreover, those aggressive actions have not been fully purged by
the Trump Presidential Memorandum of January 24, 2017, which over-
rode the Department of the Army decision of December 2, 2016.87
The Department of Army has been asked to supply further documen-
tation of its position by April 4, 2018—a deadline that it missed with
no new filing as of September 2018.88 Delay or not, with each passing
day it becomes ever clearer that there is no reason to shut down the
pipeline even if some unforeseen contingency might conceivably re-
quire alteration in some of the rules governing its operation. The pipe-
line has been in operation for close to one year, yet none of the
hypothetical harms have come to pass. In addition, at this point, the
level of dislocations have surely increased. The operation of the pipe-
line has encouraged the development of long term contracts at every
stage of the production and transmission cycles. These secure means
of transportation increase the willingness to drill by lowering the cost
of shipping crude oil to market. Similarly, at the other end of the dis-
tribution system, the secure sources of supply allow for expansion of
economic development. In the middle, the steady flow of crude oil
86. The government link to that decision has been removed. See Richard A. Ep-
stein, Lawless Bureaucratic Obstruction Is No Substitute for the Rule of Law in the




87. See Richard A. Epstein, Trump’s Big Move on Dakota Access Pipeline,
FORBES (Jan. 26, 2017, 2:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2017/01/
26/trumps-big-move-on-dakota-access-pipeline/#683cb7854c7b [https://perma.cc/
CJ78-DQEH].
88. See Albert Bender, Oil Keeps Flowing as Corps Misses Deadline for DAPL
Environmental Study, PEOPLE’S WORLD (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.peoplesworld
.org/article/oil-keeps-flowing-as-corps-misses-deadline-for-dapl-environmental-study/
[https://perma.cc/FBN2-Y7G8], concluding that “oil continues to flow, money contin-
ues to be made hand over fist by the corporate magnates of big oil, and the genocide
continues to rake in casualties.”
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provides revenues to operate and inspect the facilities. The disruptions
from stopping these activities are profound because it is no longer
possible to rewind the clock, for the many small firms in operation at
an earlier date can no longer resume their previous functions now that
they have either closed up shop or switched their business operations.
These new pipelines are of course insured, and the risk of danger de-
creases with operation. It would take a heroic set of assumptions to
think that shut-down at this stage could be warranted, which is why
the market has largely disregarded that assumption. And yet, what is
to be said for a reading of NEPA that adds immense cost and uncer-
tainty to a project when a back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis
supplies all the needed information for a decision to proceed with con-
struction at the earliest possible time?
Similarly, the dispute over the BBP illustrates the same tendencies.
At an estimated cost of $750 million, this 24-inch pipeline runs 163
miles from Nederland, Texas, to Lake Charles and St. James, Louisi-
ana.89 Both are major oil transport hubs.90 The pipeline is built to
carry some 480,000 barrels per day through wetlands, agricultural
lands, and other sensitive areas. It is buried at least three feet under-
ground across its entire route. Major efforts were taken to reduce the
footprint of the project, which had to be wide enough to permit its
inspection, repair, and maintenance. The most intrusive stage of the
process was its construction, given the need on site for open trenches
and heavy equipment. The design plan called for a rehabilitation of
affected lands, especially in the Atchafalya Basin (“Basin”), a sensi-
tive site which is home to many fish, plants and other forms of life.
The basic plan also included the acquisition of additional needed wet-
lands to replace the several hundred acres—amounting to less than
0.02% of the total 900,000 acres in the Basin—affected. The company
assumed full responsibility for leaks, acquired insurance for the pro-
ject, and tested the pipeline to show that it was possible to contain
damage even in the event of a catastrophic event—most likely from
sabotage.91
After an exhaustive trial, District Court Judge Shelly Dick halted
construction work on the BBP because the key plaintiffs in the case,
including the Atchafalaya Basinkeeper and the Sierra Club, showed
that the EA for the pipeline prepared by the Army Corps had not,
under NEPA regulations, met all permitting requirements in connec-
89. Fact Sheet, BAYOU BRIDGE PIPELINE (Mar. 2018), https://bayoubridge.com/
wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Bayou-Bridge-fact-sheet-3-12-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QJG3-SHZ4].
90. For a succinct description of these facts, see Louisiana Supports the Bayou
Bridge Project: Media Statements, BAYOU BRIDGE FACTS, https://bayoubridge.com
[https://perma.cc/XC3A-SE9X].
91. The site offered an award of $10,000 for information leading to an arrest for
vandalism on the site on March 24 and March 25, 2018, shortly after the approval
process was completed.
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tion with the Clean Water Act and the River and Harbors Act.92 The
gaps in that record meant that the Corps had acted “arbitrarily and
capriciously” by making its Finding of No Significant Impact. Her de-
cision overriding the Army Corps meant that an EIS was necessary to
address steps for mitigating environmental losses and determining the
cumulative impact of the BBP project in relation to other infrastruc-
ture projects in the Basin. Echoing a familiar refrain, Judge Dick con-
cluded that “NEPA ‘is a procedural statute that demands that the
decision to go forward with a federal project which significantly af-
fects the environment be an environmentally conscious one.’”93 Tell-
ingly, this formulation does not impose any similar procedural
requirement for the maintenance of the status quo ante, which al-
lowed the court to ignore any analysis regarding the continuing dan-
gers of the current state of affairs.
At this point, her opinion first feints in favor of deference and then
moves sharply in favor of heavy oversight. At the outset, she states
that an injunction should be issued only in “extraordinary” circum-
stances that present a “substantial threat of irreparable injury.”94
Nonetheless, Judge Dick found that there was indeed a certainty of
irreparable harm given that the construction of the pipeline necessa-
rily took about 142 acres—of a total of close to 900,000 acres—from
permanent circulation and another 300 acres temporarily out of
place.95 In addition, the Corps performed worst case studies that as-
sumed a “guillotine cut”—or complete severance of the pipe—and
noted that its control mechanisms were still effective.96 If the package
is looked at as a whole, the care and attention the Corps gave to its
overall assessment satisfies any good faith standard of judgment so
that it could never be rejected as “arbitrary and capricious,” under
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).97
In the next breath, however, Judge Dick switched to a “hard look”
standard of arbitrary and capricious that imposes a strict standard of
scrutiny under which each factor is looked at in isolation so that any
defect in the Corps’ analysis is fatal regardless of where or when it
arises.98 So even if the chances of any major leak are tiny, as Judge
92. Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 310 F. Supp. 3d 707,
740–41 (M.D. La. 2018), overruled by 894 F.3d 692 (5th Cir. 2018).
93. Id. at 715.
94. The full test reads:
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish (1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) that their substantial injury out-
weighs the threatened harm to the party whom they seek to enjoin; and (4)
that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.
Id. at 717–18.
95. Id. at 734.
96. Id. at 725.
97. Id. at 725–27.
98. See id. at 715.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL101.txt unknown Seq: 27  6-DEC-18 14:12
2018] THE MANY SINS OF NEPA 27
Dick concluded, why vacate the entire proceedings because it did not
identify the proper mitigation strategy from the permanent loss of
140-plus acres? The Corps had settled on acquiring additional wet-
lands to offset these losses, and while that number could be varied up
or down at any time, the failure to consider other mitigation devices
was a fatal omission to Judge Dick and justified a preliminary injunc-
tion.99 Any interaction between this and other pipelines is minimal at
best. So why stop the entire process to deal with a myriad of remote
possibilities before better information is acquired down the road?100
If any wetland loss counts as irreparable harm, the whole analysis
could be concluded in one sentence: no pipeline may be built in a
wetland, ever. This point was not lost on the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, which quickly issued an order that lifted the preliminary
injunction imposed by Judge Dick.101 At no point in her lengthy deci-
sion did Judge Dick consider whether the vacatur remedy was inap-
propriate under Allied Signal. But clearly any sensible sequencing of
the relevant risks suggests that it is far more dangerous to leave a
pipeline exposed to the elements than to finish the job.
IV. CONCLUSION
Reading decisions like those involving the DAPL and BBP gives
rise to this question: what was the motivation behind these two envi-
ronmental challenges? The simple answer is that it is not a narrow
focus on the operational safety of the pipelines. The larger mission in
both cases was to prevent constructing and operating any new pipeline
in order to achieve some collateral end. It is worth noting that both
cases have one theme in common: the highly skilled lawyers of
Earthjustice.org led the charge. The organization’s agenda is to stop
or at least sharply reduce the use of fossil fuels as a source of energy.
It is also likely that the SRST wanted to block the construction of the
pipeline in order to renegotiate its larger treaty and business relation-
ships with the United States and the several states. These may or may
not be laudable ends, but as a matter of first principle, the technical
issues arising under NEPA, the APA, and other environmental stat-
utes should not be turned toward these collateral ends that belong in
the political process.
Nonetheless, that is exactly what the judicial and administrative
transformation has sought to accomplish. NEPA was passed with the
intention of avoiding the catastrophic consequences that could come
from either Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring or Santa Barbara’s botched
drilling operations. In both cases, the risks are real, but so are the
99. Id. at 739.
100. Id. at 735.
101. Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 715 Fed. Appx. 399,
400 (5th Cir. 2018).
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perils of selecting the wrong institutional arrangement to deal with
them. This is evidenced by how NEPA’s mission then quickly miscar-
ried. The mistake with NEPA was assuming that the earlier common
law rules that concentrated on preventing pollution too often moved
too late, but the reality is that early legal barricades put into place as a
part of NEPA caused innovation to move too slowly. The implicit as-
sumption was that the “status quo” is safer than a brave new world
that has yet to be put into place. However, the status quo ante often
spawns far greater environmental risk than the new improvements
that could replace them. It is frequently easier to build modern facili-
ties than it is to update old and creaky ones. NEPA’s fetish for com-
plete information often leads to searching every nook and cranny for
potential risks and perils, while ignoring risks from the status quo that
were far greater.
These problems only become greater when distributing power over
any given project falls into the hands of multiple jurisdictions, and
each one could block the entire enterprise. Pipelines are the chief cas-
ualty of this approach. Today, pipelines are cheaper to build and safer
to operate than ever before. They can displace trucks and trains,
which are far more dangerous. The effort to stop pipeline develop-
ment is often less concerned with the safety of these commercial oper-
ations and more concerned with blocking the use of fossil fuels for
reasons that are wholly unrelated to the safety and efficiency of fossil
fuel transportation. These issues are well worth addressing, but covert
tools remain bad tools. The problems with fossil fuels should be faced
explicitly, and in an environment where the shortfalls of other forms
of energy are subjected to a fair and dispassionate analysis. Even
NEPA does not allow these issues to creep in through the back door.
The statute should be revised to eliminate its objectionable bias in
favor of the status quo. The payoff would be more rapid economic
development and safer transmissions with DAPL and other pipelines.
